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Multiple Directorships, Family Ownership, and Board Nominiation Committees: 
International Evidence from the GCC 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the association between outside board directorships and family 
ownership concentration. Using a sample of 1091 firm-year observations of non-financial 
publicly listed firms from Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) during the 2005 to 2013 period, 
we find a positive association between family ownership and the number of outside 
directorships held by board members. This finding is consistent with the notion that family 
ownership reduces a board’s monitoring capabilities. We also test whether the recent corporate 
governance reforms in GCC, which were designed to protect investors and minority 
shareholders, affect firms’ incentives to establish a board nomination committee (NC). We find 
the existence of a board NC and the quality and characteristics of NC membership act to 
suppress the positive association between outside directorships and family ownership. Our 
results are robust to the use of alternative measures of outside directorships and family 
ownership and models that test for endogeneity. Overall, our results suggest that the 
institutional specificities of emerging economies such as those in the GCC can sustain high 




Previous studies have shown that firms with board members who hold multiple outside 
directorships are underperformers (Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999; Ferris, Jagannathan 
and Pritchard 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2006; TNI 2008; Falato, Kadyrzhanova and Lel 2014). 
Research shows that outside directorships may reduce firm value (Ferris, Jagannathan and 
Pritchard 2003; Jiraporn, Kim and Davidson 2008), weaken a board’s monitoring ability (Fich 
and Shivdasani 2006), diminish its advisory capacity (Jiraporn, Singh and Lee 2009), reduce 
the effectiveness of outside directors as corporate monitors (Core, Holthausen and Larcker 
1999; Shivdasani and Yermack 1999), and influence firms’ financing choices and ability 
(Gilson 1990). Multiple outside directorships can thus reduce investor confidence (Fich and 
Shivdasani 2006), diminish creditor trust (Cooper and Uzun 2012), result in the transfer of 
wealth from minority to majority shareholders (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 2003), minimize the 
board’s ability to alleviate information asymmetry issues (Armstrong, Guay and Weber 2010), 
and possibly lead to an increase in agency costs (Shivdasani and Yermack 1999; Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker 1999; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Prior research (e.g., Mike Burkart, 
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Panunzi and Shleifer 2003) has also suggested that multiple outside directorships may affect 
the efficiency and effectiveness of board functioning in general and the role of various board 
committees in particular.  
Due to these concerns, governance agencies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)  
have initiated several reviews of the risks associated with multiple outside board directorships 
(Council for Institutional Investors [CII] 1998; National Association of Corporate Directors 
[NACD] 1996, and The National Investor [TNI] 2008).1 The objective of this study is to 
investigate the association between multiple outside board directorships and family ownership 
concentration in listed non-financial GCC firms.2 We further assess whether the existence and 
quality of a nomination committee (NC) suppresses the capacity of boards with family 
members to appoint other members with multiple outside directorships.  
The economic, institutional, and socio-political environment of the GCC region makes 
it an interesting setting in which to examine the corporate role of NCs and their effect on the 
development of a board structure that is in a firm’s best interests. First, the recent literature 
(e.g., Sirmon et al. 2008) suggests that the family and/or founding owners of GCC firms use 
their influence to enhance their voting power and to intervene in boards’ selection of managers 
and directors, thus controlling the firms’ decision-making processes.3 Studies (Maury 2006; 
Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan 2007; Leung, Richardson and Jaggi 2014) also provide evidence 
                                               
1 For instance, with regard to corporate governance, a guideline issued by the Council for Institutional Investors 
(CII 1998) recommends that a director should not serve on more than two other boards. The National Association 
of Corporate Directors (NACD 1996) is more flexible, indicating that a director who is the board member of a 
firm should not have directorship seats and serve on more than three boards. Corporate governance in KSA 
requires a single director should not have a seat in more than five outside directorships, and in Bahrain a single 
director should not have more than three outside directorships. In addition, the Institute for Corporate Governance 
(Hawkamah 2008) notes that directors with multiple outside directorships face difficulties in devoting enough 
time to all of the firms they serve. 
2 Six oil-rich countries, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, Qatar, 
Bahrain, and Kuwait, formed the GCC on May 25, 1981 with the aim of strengthening the socioeconomic and 
political development of the member states. The political regimes in the GCC are all considered monarchy family 
systems. 
3 For example, Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that family firms are more likely to be headed by individuals who 
hold both the CEO and chair positions. 
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that family and/or founder ownership results in Type II agency problems, whereby wealth is 
transferred from minority to family shareholders. Some 60% of the equity markets in the GCC 
are controlled by family firms (TNI 2008). Hence, the concentration of family ownership is 
much higher in the GCC than in most developed countries, where firms are owned by a diverse 
group of investors (Musa 2002). The implication is that GCC firms may face pronounced 
conflicts between minority and majority shareholders. In addition, professional surveys (e.g., 
TNI 2008) indicate that multiple directorships are a common phenomenon in GCC listed 
companies, which prior research suggests may undermine and weaken board efficiency (Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker 1999; Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 
2006). Hence, it is not unreasonable to assert that boards with high levels of family ownership 
will select busier directors, i.e., those with multiple external directorships, to assist with 
monitoring. If this is the case, then we can expect family ownership to be associated with boards 
comprised of members with multiple outside directorships.  
The GCC model of corporate governance has been influenced by the Anglo-American 
model, generally referred to as the “market model,” which focuses on maximizing shareholder 
wealth. The market model is a one-tier system in which a shareholder-elected board of directors 
is the highest governing body, and individual shareholders do not directly affect the direction 
of the firm (Keasey and Wright 1993). Consequently, the role of independent outside directors 
and ownership structure, among other factors, are important elements in monitoring managerial 
performance.4 In the market model, individual shareholders cannot directly influence the 
direction of the firm, which may give family owners the upper hand in controlling the firm’s 
affairs. Family owners holding a majority of voting shares are likely to have personal interests 
                                               
4 In contrast, the developing markets of Turkey and Korea, among others, have been described as more akin to 
the German-Japanese model of corporate governance (Robertson 2009), which serves the interests of a wider 
range of stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, and creditors. The German-Japanese model is a two-
tier system in which a board of supervisors represents the interests of stakeholders and appoints a management 
board charged with conducting the day-to-day operations of the firm. As overlapping board responsibilities are 
permitted, members of the board of supervisors must be independent of management. 
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and to use their power to take private advantage by appropriating resources, thereby 
expropriating the rights of minority shareholders (Villalonga and Amit 2006). In the GCC 
region, individual shareholder power is diluted, and family power is strong (TNI 2008). 
According to a 2008 TNI report, 25-75% of GCC firms have at least two board members from 
the same family; in some firms, families account for 100% of the board constituents. The 
adoption of the market model in the GCC, where family ownership concentration and board 
control are both prominent, can exacerbate agency-related problems. In addition, the 
differences between the GCC model of governance and those of other developed and 
developing markets suggest the possibility that corporate governance characteristics may not 
have the same level of influence on the association between multiple directorship and family 
ownership concentration as documented in studies conducted in other contexts.  
Second, corporate governance practices and codes in the GCC are distinct, due to the 
complexities of the institutional and cultural settings that distinguish its member states from 
other developed and well-established emerging economies (Bley and Chen 2006; Baydoun et 
al. 2012; Mazaheri 2013). For example, compliance with corporate governance codes is not 
mandatory in most GCC countries. In particular, these codes are silent on the issue of multiple 
directorships, and the number of outside directorships permitted is not clearly delineated. In 
the KSA and Bahrain, the number of outside board seats allowed is five and three, respectively, 
but no number is specified in the corporate governance codes of the other GCC countries. The 
leniency or silence in some of the GCC codes concerning multiple outside directorships may 
afford family-controlled firms more room to extract benefits from minority shareholders.   
 Third, emerging economies, such as those in the GCC, provide a particularly 
appropriate laboratory for studying the issue of multiple directorships. Developed economies 
such as those in the US and the UK have institutional investor organizations with a relatively 
long history of actively seeking to limit the number of multiple directorships, and firms may 
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be compelled to hire directors in accordance with recommended standards (Sarkar and Sarkar 
2009). In addition, directors themselves may share the view that taking up multiple 
directorships is not feasible, and consequently they voluntarily seek to limit the number of 
board positions they accept (Korn-Ferry International 1998). In such a situation, the frequency 
of multiple directorships is likely to be endogenously and nearly optimally determined, 
meaning that cross-sectional data may exhibit little variation within or across firm boards 
(Demsetz and Lehn 1985), which in turn makes it difficult to empirically identify the 
relationship between director busyness and family ownership concentration.  
Fourth, the effect of family ownership concentration in public firms is a growing field 
of interest in the finance and accounting literature. Because such concentration can have 
important implications, empirical evidence is of paramount importance for judging its final 
effect and for orienting regulation. To date, empirical studies of family ownership 
concentration have focused on the US, starting with Shleifer and Vishny (1986). More recently, 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) show that family ownership concentration is an effective 
organizational structure in the US, whereas Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find multiple 
directorships to adversely affect firm performance, as manifested in a positive market reaction 
following the departure of a busy director. There is a dearth of research on the effect of family 
ownership concentration in public firms outside the US (Gomez‐Mejia, Makri and Kintana 
2010). Daily, Dalton, and Rajagopalan (2003: 155) state that “agency effects may function 
differently in this context and ... prior findings from non-family samples may not readily 
generalize into this setting.” There is certainly little comprehensive evidence on this important 
issue in the GCC context. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the 
association between multiple outside directorship and family ownership concentration, and to 
assess whether the formation of separate NCs affects the relationship between family 
ownership and the appointment of busy directors in the GCC. 
7 
 
Fifth, there is an increasing drive toward improving corporate governance regimes 
across the GCC in line with the region’s rapid economic growth and the growing demand from 
regulators and international institutional investors for greater transparency and accountability. 
Evidence of governance reforms across the GCC comes from the burgeoning number of 
conferences and surveys on corporate governance and board of director quality in the region,5 
as well as the number of codes and guidelines being issued and corporate governance taskforces 
being formed in select GCC countries. In recent years, the GCC region has also seen a marked 
increase in foreign direct investment (Bley and Chen 2006). Further, there has been a general 
move toward opening the doors to international investment, with many new initiatives 
appearing in the wake of the global financial crisis (Bley and Saad 2011).  
Finally, the GCC has strengthened its regulatory and financial institutions and adopted 
more reforms of the business environment. For instance, in 2013, the World Bank declared the 
KSA to be the region’s highest-ranking economy in terms of the “overall ease of doing 
business,” placing it globally in the 22nd spot among 185 countries (Mazaheri 2013). The 
region’s political setting (family monarchical system) provides us with a very interesting 
setting in which to investigate the association between family ownership and board monitoring, 
as that political setting is considered to be one of the main reasons for GCC countries’ initiation 
of business environment reforms. As (Mazaheri 2013, p. 296) writes, “monarchies are better 
able to solve the credible commitment problem between the government and existing private 
sector elites than non-monarchical, authoritarian states.”  
To sum up, the institutional aspects of corporate governance in the GCC present a new 
and interesting context for the study of the association between multiple directorships and 
concentrated family ownership. In addition, GCC markets have become increasingly important 
to investors seeking higher returns and better opportunities and for countries seeking 
                                               
5 See Hawkamah website [Link: http://www.hawkamah.org/] 
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investment projects, creating a greater demand for directors with high-quality monitoring and 
advising attributes (Baydoun et al. 2012). 
This study contributes to the literature in several significant ways. First, it adds to the 
governance literature by investigating the influence of family ownership control on Type II 
agency and institution-based theories. Prior research (e.g., Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan 2007; 
Leung, Richardson and Jaggi 2014; Maury 2006; Villalonga and Amit 2006) has focused on 
Type I agency (Peng et al. 2009; Peng and Jiang 2010). The common attributes of the 
monarchical political regimes in the GCC, such as kinship relations, interact with financing 
objectives by facilitating business transactions. Favoritism is a preferred practice in hiring, 
promoting, and transferring assets (Mazaheri 2013), and intermarriages often occur between 
established business families and elites. These factors suggest that the GCC business 
environment is family-dominated. Institutional theory argues that if both formal and informal 
institutions are used to govern firm behavior, then in situations in which formal constraints are 
unclear or ineffective, informal constraints will play a larger role in reducing uncertainty, 
providing guidance, and conferring legitimacy and rewards on managers and firms (Peng et al. 
2009). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to use institutional theory to 
explain the association between family ownership and director busyness.  
Second, we examine the association between family ownership or control and the 
existence of directors who hold multiple outside directorships (see e.g., Ferris, Jagannathan 
and Pritchard 2003; Perry and Peyer 2005; Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Hunton and Rose 2008; 
Jiraporn, Kim and Davidson 2008; Jiraporn et al. 2009; Jiraporn, Singh and Lee 2009; Field, 
Lowry and Mkrtchyan 2013). We provide new empirical evidence to show that family-
controlled firms in the GCC have a greater number of busy directors on their boards. 
Third, we investigate the effect of an NC on reducing the influence of family control 
over the appointment of board members with outside directorships, which may in turn mitigate 
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agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders in family-run public businesses. 
This component of the study is of particular importance given the development of governance 
regimes in family-dominated businesses in emerging economies such as those in the GCC. 
Prior studies find mixed evidence regarding the association between outside directorships and 
the committee membership of board members. For example, (Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard 
2003; Jiraporn, Singh and Lee 2009) find that directors with multiple directorships are less 
likely to be members of board committees such as audit committees (ACs). In contrast, Faleye, 
Hoitash, and Hoitash (2011) find that internal committees’ assignment and memberships are 
compromised on behalf of a monitoring committee (e.g., an AC and compensation committee 
[CC]) when firms have boards with members who have more outside directorships. We argue 
that the existence of an NC is likely to have a direct influence on the selection of board members 
and that factors other than multiple directorships may also be included in the selection process. 
Our results confirm this argument: the existence of an NC suppresses the degree of family 
control over increasing the number of multiple directorships among board members. Finally, 
the results of this study have important implications for regulators, investors, and policymakers, 
particularly with regard to the protection of minority shareholders. 
First, we find that family ownership is significantly associated with multiple outside 
directorships among board members, which supports our hypothesis that family owners sustain 
control by employing busier or less experienced directors on firm boards. Second, our results 
show that the interaction between the presence of an NC and family ownership is negatively 
and significantly associated with multiple directorships. Third, NC quality, as measured by the 
proportion of independent directors on the NC, and component factor analysis are found to 
have the same effect on multiple directorships. An intriguing result is that the existence and 
quality of a specialized board committee such as an NC appears to improve board effectiveness. 
Our results are robust to the use of multiple variable specifications and various endogeneity 
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tests, suggesting that they could be of use to regulators and stock market authorities seeking to 
understand the effects of multiple directorships of GCC firm board members.     
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the GCC political 
and economic environment and Section 3 develops the theory and hypotheses guiding the 
study. Section 4 describes the research design, specific data sources, and sample selection used 
in the study and provides summary statistics. Section 5 documents the empirical results, Section 
6 discusses robustness tests, and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. BACKGROUND: FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
THE GCC REGION 
 
The emerging economies of the GCC collectively constitute a rapidly growing group 
of developing countries that derive a considerable amount of their income from oil exports (Al-
Malkawi, Pillai and Bhatti 2014; Al-Shammari, Brown and Tarca 2008) and that have rapidly 
expanding equity markets. Economic development in the GCC has been accompanied by an 
increase in the number of listed firms, which grew from 473 in 2005 to 705 in 2013.6 GCC 
stock markets have recently attracted international investors in line with significant changes in 
member states’ economic and financial environment. The liberalization of GCC capital markets 
has taken place through several reforms in regulation and governance.7  
2.1 Family Ownership 
Previous studies have examined how the ownership structure of firms affects corporate 
board monitoring and effectiveness (Mak and Li 2001; Fama and Jensen 1983), documenting 
that family control introduces agency problems for minority shareholders and rent-seeking 
activities. For instance, Villalonga and Amit (2006) argue that agency conflicts are costlier for 
                                               
6 See the Gulfbase website at http://www.gulfbase.com/ 
7 These reforms are “low interest rates, minimum translation of costs and uncertainty about capital repatriation, 
and new laws and governance to protect property rights, reduce corruption and ease ownership restrictions” (Al‐
Hadi, Hasan and Habib 2015, p. 67). 
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firms that are owned or controlled by family groups. Andres, Bongard, and Lehmann (2013) 
demonstrate that firm value decreases when family groups impose control over management 
and directors. In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Anderson and Reeb (2003), and Maury 
(2006) reveal that in countries in which shareholder protection and transparency are weak, the 
potential for expropriation by family controllers may erode value for minority shareholders. 
Different shareholder groups typically have substantial equity ownership in companies listed 
on the GCC stock exchanges (Al-Shammari, Brown and Tarca 2008). These groups include 
governments and their agencies, dominant families, institutional investors, and minority 
shareholders. The GCC’s business environment is considered to be family-dominated, and 
family-controlled firms are represented by a small number of family investors (Al-Yahyaee, 
Pham and Walter 2011). Some 60% of GCC firm equity is owned by just 208 large family 
groups (TNI 2008; Hawkamah 2013). The degree of family ownership concentration is much 
higher in GCC firms than in their counterparts in the US and in other developed and developing 
countries. In fact, most businesses in the GCC have few controlling shareholders, and family 
ownership is predominant (Saidi 2004). The diverse shareholder ownership that is common in 
Western countries, and the resulting separation of ownership and control that highlights the 
stewardship and monitoring aspects of non-executive directors’ functions, is limited in the 
GCC. The GCC family ownership concentration ratio by country is high, and is maintained by 
such practices as making rights issues to existing shareholders and inviting wealthy, influential 
families to subscribe to shares in IPOs (Musa 2002). Yasin, Shehab, and Saidi (2004) suggest 
that the high degree of concentrated family ownership in the GCC undermines the principles 
of good corporate governance. 
                                               
8 As the degree of ownership/powerful concentration in the hands of a few families is very high in GCC equity 
markets, TNI (2008) aggregates the top ten families in each market and each country. The survey lists these 
powerful families as a collection of individuals from the same country with the same surname (family name). See 
Appendix 2 for detailed information. 
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Family groups launched businesses in the GCC at an early stage of national 
development, and have managed to maintain ownership over several generations (Anderson 
and Reeb 2004). Members of these controlling families routinely occupy the highest position 
in the firm (e.g., chairperson or CEO), and have incentives to appoint other family members to 
firm boards and management teams (Hawkamah 2013; Jaggi, Leung and Gul 2009). Therefore, 
the family-controlled publically listed firms in GCC economies are subject to severe Type II 
agency conflicts between minority and majority shareholders and pronounced rent-seeking 
problems, which together work to diminish the effects of corporate governance practices (Ali, 
Chen and Radhakrishnan 2007).  
2.2 Corporate Governance  
The organizational and legal structures that shape policies and governance practices in 
developed economies may not necessarily be applicable to emerging markets such as those of 
the GCC (Fan, Wei and Xu 2011). Corporate governance practices and codes in the GCC are 
distinct due to the complexities of their institutional and cultural settings, which differ from 
those of developed and well-established emerging economies (Bley and Chen 2006; Baydoun 
et al. 2012; Mazaheri 2013). Although compliance with corporate governance codes is not 
mandatory in some GCC countries (e.g., Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait; see Appendix 1), many 
firms in the GCC have implemented corporate governance practices (Hawkamah 2010; OECD 
2011; Al-Malkawi, Pillai and Bhatti 2014; Al‐Hadi, Hasan and Habib 2015). Several 
professional surveys carried out in the GCC suggest that corporate governance is one of the 
primary concerns in the GCC business environment. A number of institutions and regulatory 
bodies have established guidelines on how the region’s public and private firms can implement 
corporate governance practices (Al-Malkawi, Pillai and Bhatti 2014; Dalwai, Basiruddin and 
Abdul Rasid 2015) for several reasons. First, the collapse of many firms in the region (e.g., the 
Al Gosaibi-Saad Group) as a result of their inability to fulfill their obligations to financial 
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institutions during the global financial crisis prompted banks to require better corporate 
governance practices and greater disclosure and transparency;9 this has led to the adoption of 
such practices by an increasing number of GCC firms. Second, as the GCC region has become 
the financial and commercial hub of the Middle East (Baydoun et al. 2012), the regulatory 
bodies and legal environments in GCC economies are playing a vital role in the establishment 
and implementation of governance reforms. Third, both regulators and investors are aware that 
corporate governance provides several benefits to firms such as achieving high levels of market 
confidence, the protection of both foreign and minority shareholders, economic diversification, 
and investment opportunities (Fasano and Iqbal 2003; Mina 2007; Callen et al. 2014).  
Recent amendments10 to GCC governance codes such as those concerning board 
composition and committee formation, specialized NCs in particular, have been adopted by 
most of the GCC. For instance, the governance codes of Kuwait, the KSA and the UAE now 
mandate the formation of an NC, although NC composition varies depending on country-
specific regulations. Oman’s corporate governance code does not mandate NC formation, but 
the number of Omani firms establishing one gradually increased between 2005 and 2013 (see 
Table 5A). The corporate governance code in the KSA allows firms to form a combined NC 
and CC, whereas those in Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait require firms to form a separate NC 
(these codes are called comply or explain codes).11 In this study, we investigate one important 
aspect of the recent corporate governance reforms in the GCC, namely, the adoption of NCs.12  
3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Multiple Directorships 
                                               
9 See Al‐Hadi, Hasan, and Habib (2015) on bank regulations in GCC countries. 
10 Corporate governance rules were amended in GCC countries as follows: in the UAE in April 2010, Oman in 
March 2015, Kuwait in September 2013, and the KSA on January 5, 2009.  
11 See Appendix 1. 
12According to Uzun, Szewczyk, and Varma (2004) and Ruigrok et al. (2006), NCs are established for the purpose 
of identifying and selecting board members to improve board effectiveness, evaluate directors’ qualifications, and 
manage board composition to ensure its independence as a long-term function. 
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Multiple directorships (a proxy for board busyness) refer to the number of outside 
directorships (i.e., three, four, or five) held by the board members of a focal firm (Fich and 
Shivdasani 2006; Jiraporn et al. 2009).13 Prior research shows that outside directorships can be 
valuable to a firm. For instance, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that firms are motivated to 
appoint outside directors to improve the reputation and monitoring capabilities of their 
directors. Empirical studies have also shown that these attributes are valued differently 
depending on a firm’s operation cycle. For example, Field, Lowry, and Mkrtchyan (2013) 
suggest that during IPOs, firms that lack public market experience are most likely to depend 
on expert directors who have multiple outside directorships; these directors may prove essential 
to the firms’ ability to compete and use resources effectively. Furthermore, prior studies (e.g., 
Gilson 1990; Wilson, Wright and Scholes 2013) find that firms with multiple outside 
directorships are able to obtain financing more readily during periods of financial distress 
through their business and relation ties.  
Conversely, there is also research suggesting that appointing busy directors to a board 
can undermine or at least weaken board efficiency (Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999; Ferris, 
Jagannathan and Pritchard 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2006). Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard 
(2003) find that reputable directors are unlikely to take directorships in poorer performing 
firms. Jiraporn, Kim, and Davidson (2008) investigate the relation between multiple 
directorships and firm diversification, and find that firms with more outside board directorships 
engage in more diversification, which may diminish firm value. Ferris, Jagannathan, and 
Pritchard (2003) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) contend that directors are overcommitted 
when they hold several directorships, thus weakening firm performance. Furthermore, Hunton 
and Rose (2008) investigate busy directors’ responses to auditor recommendations, and find 
                                               
13 We use “busyness” and “multiple directorships” interchangeably in this paper.  
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that relative to directors who hold a single directorship, directors with multiple outside 
directorships have less incentive to accept an auditor’s restatement recommendations.  
Several studies also address the association between multiple outside directorships and 
CEO compensation and firm performance. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) show that 
multiple outside directorships are likely to weaken board monitoring and create avenues for 
CEOs to benefit from excessive rewards, resulting in poor firm performance. We argue that 
family owners have an incentive to rely on directors with multiple directorships to reduce the 
risk of their control being diminished. 
The restrictions on multiple outside directorships in GCC corporate governance codes 
are not clearly delineated. For example, in the KSA and Bahrain, the numbers of outside board 
seats allowed are five and three, respectively, but the number is not specified in the codes of 
the other countries (TNI 2008). This silence in many GCC corporate governance codes may 
give family owners more power to extract benefits from minority shareholders, which is 
consistent with our main hypothesis. In addition, the differences in GCC codes regarding 
multiple directorships facilitate our ability to examine whether countries that regulate the 
number of outside board seats have better governance than those that do not.  
3.2 Hypotheses Development 
3.2.1 Association between Family Ownership and Multiple Directorships 
Multiple directorships have received considerable attention in the literature and in 
governance surveys because of the fragmented nature of the monitoring and disciplining role 
that may occur if board members take on too many directorships (Ferris, Jagannathan and 
Pritchard 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2006). Busy directors have more incentive to shirk their 
core responsibilities, which may include attending and contributing fully to the committees to 
which they have been appointed members (e.g., Jiraporn, Singh and Lee 2009), and they have 
less incentive or time to attend board meetings (Jiraporn et al. 2009).  
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In this study, two theories are applied to investigate the association between family 
ownership and control and the existence of multiple outside directorships: Type II agency 
theory and institutional theory. Several studies suggest that Type II agency theory is useful for 
explaining governance in family-owned and family-controlled firms (e.g., Ali, Chen and 
Radhakrishnan 2007; Maury 2006; Leung, Richardson and Jaggi 2014). This theory suggests 
that controlling shareholders engage in activities designed to serve their own interests and, if 
families, to maximize family wealth (Fan and Wong 2002). Such activities may include 
increasing their ownership stake (Maury 2006), strengthening their voting power (Villalonga 
and Amit (2006), reducing corporate governance disclosures (Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan 
2007), and decreasing firm diversification to enjoy personal control and to exercise their 
authority (Gomez‐Mejia, Makri and Kintana 2010), thereby maintaining control over minority 
shareholders.14  
Previous studies also find that family control reduces board monitoring. Anderson and 
Reeb (2004) find that family owners weaken board monitoring by reducing the number of 
independent directors (Jaggi and Leung 2007) and that family directors reduce the number of 
board meetings. Additionally, (Villalonga and Amit 2006) report that family-owned or 
controlled firms usually combine the CEO and chair positions.  
Family shareholders are likely to appoint directors who will not act against their wishes 
(Jaggi, Leung and Gul 2009). Prior studies show that busy directors attend fewer meetings, fail 
to ask hard questions, and place less importance on and dedicate less effort to monitoring 
activities (Walsh and Seward 1990). In contrast, less busy directors may protect minority 
shareholders by contributing more time and effort to monitoring the board (Leung, Richardson 
                                               
14 Researchers also find that family firms are more likely to control executive positions by exercising managerial 




and Jaggi 2014), a view supported by Lane et al. (2006), who find that busy directors are more 
faithful to controlling family owners.  
Given the social power and control of family-controlled or family-owned firms in the 
GCC, family owners are likely to preserve control and maximize family/personal wealth 
(agency type II), which suggests that we should expect family-controlled groups to appoint 
directors with insufficient time, experience, and spare effort to question board-directed 
strategies and plans (Villalonga and Amit 2006; Jiraporn, Kim and Davidson 2008; Jiraporn, 
Singh and Lee 2009).  
 In addition to agency theory, the power and control of family-controlled and family-
owned firms may be viewed from the perspective of institutional theory (Peng et al. 2009), 
which suggests that when formal constraints (laws, rules, and regulations) are unclear or fail, 
informal constraints (culture, norms, and values) take over that role by providing guidance and 
reducing uncertainty. Thus, control by family-owned firms may substitute for regulations and 
governance systems in the GCC. The management literature (Peng et al. 2009; Peng and Jiang 
2010) suggests that the institution-based view may explain the effects of societal norms and 
values on business transactions. This effect is evident in a range of emerging markets such as 
India, China, Indonesia, Argentina, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Taiwan, which are 
characterized by weak regulatory regimes (e.g., weak investor protection and governance 
regulations), strong social ties, and the substitution of local family networks for market 
regulations (e.g., corporate governance and investor protection regulations). For instance, 
Kedia, Mukherjee, and Lahiri (2006) reveal that family and business groups rely on their 
informal networks and alliances to influence formal regimes. 
In the GCC, family-controlled businesses are considered an important part of 
government economic reforms. Strong tribal customs and the involvement of prominent 
families in business mean that governments in the region take family interests into 
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consideration in their economic reforms and regulatory enforcement (Khalifah al‐Yousef 
2008). For example, Mazaheri (2013) shows that the social structures of GCC communities are 
dominated by tribal culture, cronyism, and close personal ties. Furthermore, the institution-
based view and strong secrecy culture of GCC society is reflected in the many family 
controlling shareholders who have a strong desire to maintain their families’ privacy, 
confidentiality, and autonomy. Busy board members, who exert less effort, allow family 
shareholders to share less information, power, and management than directors, who have more 
time and incentive for in-depth investigations15 (Pearl Initiative 2012).16 
Therefore, we hypothesize the following. 
H1: GCC listed firms with highly concentrated family ownership and control are positively 
associated with the presence of directors with multiple directorships on their corporate boards. 
 
The literature suggests that board efficiency is associated with board structure and the 
functioning of board committees (Harrison 1987; Brick and Chidambaran 2010; Tao and 
Hutchinson 2013). The formation of board committees attracts scholars and regulators because 
of the central role played by committees in setting objectives, monitoring, and advising the 
firm (Harrison 1987; Carter et al. 2010). For instance, Klein (1998) investigates the relationship 
between the presence of specialized board committees and the role of directors in those 
committees, and documents a positive association between the existence of financing and 
investment committees and a firm’s stock market performance. This finding supports the notion 
that decisions made by groups (e.g., committees) are of higher quality than those made by 
individuals (e.g., family members) (Hill 1982). 
Harrison (1987) reveals that internal board monitoring committees such as NCs are 
responsible for providing shareholders with an independent view of corporate affairs. For 
                                               
15 This is particularly so with regard to the issues of firm management and the transfer of power from one 
generation to the next.  
16 The Pearl Initiative issued a report on the governance of family businesses in GCC countries in 2012 based on 
an analysis of more than 100 interviews with senior figures in these businesses in collaboration with 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC). See http://www.pearlinitiative.org. 
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instance, an NC promotes corporate legitimacy and also provides objectivity in decision-
making, which may protect the interests of individual board members, particularly with regard 
to the selection and retention of directors. Given that busy directors are less likely to engage in 
monitoring (Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999), institutional investors and shareholders view 
the presence of an NC as an important signal of a board’s ability to build and maintain 
independence (Shivdasani and Yermack 1999). In the US, for example, the corporate 
governance guidelines formulated by the Council for Institutional Investors (CII 1998) 
encourage firms to establish an NC to improve board efficiency through the appointment of 
qualified members to the board (Uzun, Szewczyk and Varma 2004). In addition, an NC 
Monitoring Committee continually monitors the performance of directors and evaluates the 
effectiveness of firms’ internal corporate governance structure (Adams and Ferreira 2007).  
Consistent with H1, Maury (2006) shows that conflicts between family and minority 
shareholders are more pronounced in countries characterized by a low degree of investor 
protection and a high degree of concentrated family ownership. The establishment of an NC 
that is dominated by qualified independent directors may reduce a controlling family’s power 
to increase the number of board members’ outside directorships. Although there is growing 
evidence of the effectiveness of corporate governance regulations in emerging markets such as 
those in the GCC, the debate over the functions of corporate governance in family-owned and 
family-controlled public firms has not been extended to the NC context. Given the effects of 
such regulation on the formation of NCs, the existence of such a committee may reduce family 
control over the selection of busy board directors. We hypothesize that the positive association 
between family ownership and control and the appointment of busy directors is suppressed by 
the existence of an NC. To test this expectation, we propose the following hypothesis.  
H2: The positive association between family ownership and control and the appointment of 




4. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Data and Sample  
Our sample comprises 185 non-financial firms drawn from stock markers in Bahrain, 
Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, KSA, and UAE over the 2005 to 2013 period. The data are from S&P 
Capital IQ. Panel A of Table 1 shows that our initial sample comprises 3286 firm-year 
observations. We exclude 72 jointly listed firm-years, 1688 firm-years with missing corporate 
governance data, and 435 firm-year observations with missing key control variables, giving us 
a final sample of 1091 firm-year observations. Corporate governance variables and family 
ownership data are hand-collected from the sample firms’ annual reports, which are available 
from the six GCC stock markets and the firms’ websites.17  
Panel B of Table 1 shows that Omani firms account for 45% of our sample, followed 
by the KSA (40%), the UAE (10%), Bahrain (4%), and Qatar (0.01%). Panel C of Table 1 
shows that 20.67% of our sample is derived from the Materials industry sector, followed by 
firms belonging to the Industrial (19%) and Consumer (15%) industry sectors.  
[Insert Table 1, Panels A, B and C about here] 
4.2 Variable Description 
 
Dependent Variable: We use three variables (Busy_BSize, Busy(log), and Busy02) to proxy for 
the extent of multiple outside directorships or director busyness. In line with previous studies, 
Busy_BSize refers to the total number of outside directorships held by all of the board members, 
scaled by the total number of board members or board size (Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Jiraporn, 
Kim and Davidson 2008). Busy(log) is calculated as the natural logarithm of the total number of 
outside directorships held by all of the board members. Busy02 is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the board has at least one member with two or more outside directorships, and 0 otherwise 
(Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Jiraporn, Kim and 
                                               
17 Furthermore, not all of the firms disclose the number of outside directorships held by board members owing to 
varying corporate governance code requirements (see Appendix1).  
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Davidson 2008). These proxies are used to reduce any potential endogeneity issues. In our 
robustness checks, we use two other measures (Busy03 and Busy04).18  
 
Independent Variables 
Family ownership and nomination committee data are hand-collected from firms’ 
annual reports, corporate governance reports, stock market filings, Capital IQ filings, and the 
firms’ websites. There is no corporate governance database currently available for GCC firms. 
Typically, data pertaining to family ownership and the nomination committee are obtained 
from the corporate governance and ownership sections of firms’ annual reports. Data on 
ownership are examined to ascertain if it there is information about the founding owners of the 
firm, or if the founding owners are represented by another entity. For instance, some owners 
are institutions that are in turn owned by founding family members.  
Our family ownership variables measure the percentage of family ownership of a firm’s 
share capital (FamOwn%) and the number of directors on the board belonging to one of the top 
10 family groups (Claessens et al. 2000) that have been identified in the GCC (FamilTop10(log)). 
We score the ultimate family owner or the family connections with one of the top-10 family 
groups as 1, irrespective of whether board members also have family connections with the 
ultimate owner. TNI reports (TNI 2008) assist us in identifying the 10 largest family 
shareholders among all of the publicly traded firms in the GCC.19 Following Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006), we use FamOwn% to measure the degree of 
family ownership concentration, which provides an indication of the degree of control that 
                                               
18 Busy03 and Busy04 refer to boards with at least one member who has three or more outside directorships and 
four or more outside directorships, respectively. All of the busyness measures for year t are taken from the 
voluntary or mandatory disclosures in the annual reports of firms incorporated in GCC stock markets. 
19 We find that these families retain their positions throughout our sample period. We use the natural log of the 
number of directors that belong to the top-10 family groups in the GCC based on the TNI survey (2008). We also 
find that this pattern family ownership does not significantly change during our sample period.  
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family members have over board decision-making. Appendix 2 provides the names of these 10 
family groups.20  
Our NC committee variables are NC_D, which is scored as 1 if a firm has a nomination 
committee, and otherwise 0; NC_Ind%, which is calculated as the number of independent 
directors on the NC scaled by the total number of nomination committee members; and 
NC_Factor, which is a factor score of five governance attributes of the NC. We follow Al‐
Hadi, Hasan, and Habib (2015) and Tao and Hutchinson (2013) by applying factor analysis to 
five governance attributes of the NC committee, namely NC_Ind%, NC_Size, NC_ChairInd, 
NC_NoMeeting, and NC_NoQual. NC_Size is the number of directors on the NC scaled by 
board size; NC_ChairInd is scored as 1 if the NC is chaired by an independent director, and 
otherwise 0. NC_NoMeeting is calculated as a natural logarithm of the number of nomination 
committee meetings, and NC_NoQual is scored as 1 if the NC has at least one director with 
accounting or finance qualifications such as a CPA, ACCA, and CFA, and otherwise 0. 
Control Variables  
We use the following control variables: the number of years since incorporation (Age), 
the natural logarithm of the total number of board members (Boardsize(log)), the natural 
logarithm of total assets (Size), sales growth (Sale_Growth), operating margin (OpMargin), 
director ownership (DirOwnership), and AC characteristics (AC_Factor). A firm’s age is 
expected to be negatively associated with the number of directorships, as posited by Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006), who find that firms are able to reduce the perceived risk associated with 
busyness over time. We expect a positive association between board size and the number of 
outside directorships held by board members. Firm size is computed as the natural logarithm 
                                               
20 As a robustness check, we use two alternative measures of family ownership: Fam_D and FamMem_D. Fam_D 
is a dummy variable scored as 1 if the family has shares in the firm, and 0 otherwise. FamMem_D is computed as 
a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has more than two directors from the same family on the 




of total assets and is expected to be positively associated with board busyness (Ferris, 
Jagannathan and Pritchard 2003). Following Fich and Shivdasani (2006), we also control for 
sales growth (Sale_Growth), which is measured as sales in year t minus sales from the previous 
year, i.e., t-1, scaled by sales in t-1. A firm’s operating margin (OpMargin) is measured as 
operating income scaled by total assets, which is expected to exhibit no significant association 
with our directorship proxies. Directors who own more than 5% of a firm’s stock 
(DirOwnership) are more likely to consider the risks associated with the directorships held by 
board members. Following previous studies (Al‐Hadi, Hasan and Habib 2015; Faleye, Hoitash 
and Hoitash 2011), we also use AC_Factor to control for the influence of AC characteristics 
on board busyness (see Table 2, Panel C).21  
4.3 Model Design  
 
To investigate the association between family ownership and board busyness, we use 
Tobit22 (Busy_BSize), ordinary least-squares (OLS) (Busy(log)), and logistic (Busy02) models, 
respectively.23 
Busy_BSize / Busy(log) / Busy02i,t = α0 + α1 FamOwn%i,t + α2 Agei,t + α3 Boardsizei,t + α4  Sizei,t 
+ α5 Sale_Growthi,t  + α6  OpMargini,t + α7  DirOwnershipi,t + α8  AC_Factori,t +  Year 
Dummies + IND Dummies + Country Dummies + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                               (1) 
    
Our main variable of interest is FamOwn% or FamilTop10(log). We expect the coefficient to be 
positive and significant for both variables. To examine the association between busyness and 
the interaction between FamOwn% and an NC (NC_D), we use the following OLS model. 
Busy_BSize / Busy(log) / Busy02i,t = α0 +  α1 FamOwn%i,t +  α2 NC_D i,t  +  α3 FamOwn% * 
NC_D i,t +  α4 Agei,t + α5 Boardsizei,t + α6  Sizei,t + α7 Sale_Growthi,t  + α8  OpMargini,t + α9  
DirOwnershipi,t + α10 AC_Factori,t +  Year + IND FE + Country FE + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (2) 
 
Finally, as a robustness check, we also used NC_D with NC_Ind% and NC_Factor.  
                                               
21 We include three AC characteristics (i.e., AC chairman independence, AC size, and AC director independence) 
in the factor analysis of the audit committee governance attributes. 
22 We use Tobit analysis in this instance, as the dependent variable Busy_BSize has a number of variables clustered 
at a limited value zero (McDonald and Moffitt 1980).  
23 Following Al‐Hadi, Hasan and Habib (2015), we conduct a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test (Breusch and Pagan 
1980) to ascertain which model is more appropriate for our main analysis. The LM test shows that we cannot 




5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the variables included in the regression models for all of 
the GCC countries are reported in Table 2 of Panel A. Although most GCC corporate 
governance codes do not require identification of the number of outside directorships held by 
board members (except for the KSA and Bahrain; see Appendix 1), our measure of multiple 
outside directorships is consistent with that used in prior studies. The mean (median) values of 
the Busy_BSize, Busy(log), and Busy02 indices are 31.6 (29.0), 1.046 (1.0), and 0.559 (1.0), 
respectively. These mean values are similar to those reported in previous studies: 33.7 reported 
by Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) and 42.0 reported by Jiraporn, Kim, and Davidson 
(2008). Panel A shows that the mean (median) of FamOwn% (percentage of family ownership 
for firm i in year t) in the sample period is 0.078 (0.00), which is similar to the mean of 0.06 
reported by Villalonga and Amit (2006). Overall, our variables are largely consistent with those 
reported in prior studies (Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2006; 
Field, Lowry and Mkrtchyan 2013). 
[Insert Table 2 Panel A about here] 
5.2 Univariate Analysis  
Table 2 of Panel B shows the mean difference and t-statistics of multiple outside 
directorships with and without family ownership. We find that all of the measures of multiple 
outside directorships are significantly higher for firms with family ownership (t-values of 3.56, 
3.29, and 4.52 with p<0.01 for Busy_BSize, Busy(log), and Busy02, respectively). This provides 
support for H1: family ownership increases board busyness. Table 2 shows that firms with 
family ownership are older than their counterparts, have higher levels of director ownership, 
poorer AC quality, and a lower level of assets. 
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[Insert Table 2 Panel B about here] 
5.3 Factor Analysis 
Panel C of Table 2 summarizes the results of the factor analyses of the governance 
attributes of both the NC and AC. Following Al‐Hadi, Hasan, and Habib (2015), we conduct 
component factor analyses for both the NC and AC. For the NC, we use five governance 
variables: NC_Ind%, NC_Size, NC_ChairInd, NC_NoMeeting, and NC_NoQual.24 All of the 
factor loadings are greater than 65%. For the AC, we use AC_ChairInd, AC_Size, and 
AC_DirInd%. We obtain loadings of 64% and 67.31% for NC_Factor and AC_Factor, 
respectively. The goal of factor analysis is to identify commonalities or factors underlying our 
measures of corporate governance quality. Such factors are unobservable but manifest 
themselves through these observable outcomes (Bushman, Piotroski and Smith 2004). 
Following Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004), we retain factors with eigenvalues greater 
than 1; using this criterion, the analysis reveals one factor for each committee. Following 
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004), we then rotate the factors using the varimax rotation 
technique to clarify the interpretation of these factors. We present the rotation results in Panel 
C Table 2.  
Using the NC factor 1, qualifications appear relatively unimportant with a weight of 
1%. Thus, the factor represents and captures substantial commonalities among the governance 
attributes of the NC. This clustering is intuitively correct, as an NC committee with a higher 
number of independent directors is more likely to be headed by an independent committee 
chair, and both the independent chair and independent directors will regularly meet to monitor 
and administer board appointments and remuneration. Furthermore, both the number of 
independent directors and chair are highly correlated with committee size. We have labeled 
                                               
24 NC_Ind% is the percentage of independent directors on the NC, and NC_Factor is an eigenvalue obtained from 
five NC characteristics: NC size, independence of NC chairperson, number of independent directors on the NC, 
number of NC meetings per year, and qualifications of NC members. 
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this factor the NC_Factor. We also repeat this process for the governance attributes (number 
of independent members, existence of an independent chair and size) of the audit committee 
(AC) giving rise to an audit committee factor AC_Factor. Prior studies (e.g., Klein 2002) 
measure the AC as a dummy variable or as the number of independent directors on the audit 
committee. The results of the varimax rotation suggest that audit committee chair independence 
and size are important, whereas the number of independent audit committee directors is not.  
[Insert Table 2 Panel C about here] 
5.4 Correlation Analysis 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix between the dependent and independent 
variables included in this study. Consistent with the univariate analysis results, we find a 
positive and significant correlation between firms with multiple outside directorships and 
family ownership. For instance, FamOwn% is positively correlated with Busy02 at p < 0.1. 
Furthermore, firms with a higher proportion of top-10 family directors on their boards 
(FamilTop10(log)) are positively correlated with all of the directorship proxies (Busy_BSize, 
Busy(log), and Busy02) at p < 0.01. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
5.5 Regression Analysis 
5.5.1 Family Ownership and Busyness 
Table 4 presents the OLS estimates of the association between family ownership 
(FamOwn%, and FmilTop10(log)) and the multiple outside directorship proxies (Busy_BSize, 
Busy(log), and Busy02). Consistent with H1, we find the coefficients between these proxies and 
the family ownership variables to be positive and statistically significant. More specifically, in 
models 1 to 3, we find that the coefficients (0.112, 0.317, and 1.002) between these variables 
are significant at p < 0.05. We also find the association between family ownership, as 
represented by the number of top-10 families, and the multiple outside directorship proxies in 
models 4 to 6 are statistically significant at p < 0.01. Our regression results are consistent with 
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the tenets of Type II agency theory, whereby family board members control voting rights 
through their concentrated ownership (Anderson and Reeb 2003; Villalonga and Amit 2006). 
Consistent with Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan (2007), these findings suggest that family 
directors control the information flow in firms and participate in activities designed to reward 
themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. Furthermore, as GCC regulatory 
frameworks are in their infancy, family domination, tribalism, customs, and traditions affect 
the strategic decisions of boards.  
We also find that multiple outside directorships are significantly associated with three 
of our control variables: board size, firm size, and AC quality. These results are consistent with 
those of prior studies (Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2006). We 
include country, industry, and year dummies as controls in all of our regression models, and 
also corrected standard errors for hetereoscedasticity, serial correlation, and autocorrelation 
using White’s (1980) and Newey and West’s (1987) tests. All of the variables are Winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% levels. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
5.5.2 H2: Association between Busyness and Interaction between Ownership and NC  
 
We test whether the existence of an NC moderates the association between family 
ownership and multiple outside directorships. Given the regulatory effect of NC formation, an 
NC can be considered a specialized committee responsible for assessing and appointing board 
members (Harrison 1987; Uzun, Szewczyk and Varma 2004). Hence, we hypothesize that an 
NC will be an effective monitor, and thus suppress actions that benefit families at the expense 
of minority shareholders; specifically, it will reduce board members’ number of outside 
directorships.  
Table 5 reports the results of the regression of the interactions between NC 
characteristics and family ownership using different proxies for directorships. Model 1 exhibits 
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our primary specification and estimates our baseline regression, whereas models 2 and 3 
examine alternative NC and directorships proxies. In accordance with H2, we find that the 
coefficient of the interactions between family ownership and the NC variables (NC_D, 
NC_Ind%, and NC_Factor) are negatively associated with the multiple outside directorships 
proxies (Busy_Bsize, Busy(log), and Busy02) to a statistically significant degree, which suggests 
that firms with family representation on the board and an NC in place have fewer busy directors 
than other firms. For instance, in model 1 (Table 4), we find that the coefficient of the 
association between Busy_BSize and FamOwn% Model is 0.1120**,25 which is significant at 
the 0.05% level. Additionally, firms with family ownership (FamOwn%) and an NC have 
reduced family control with a size effect of 0.0187 (0.1998*** FamOwn% + -0.1811* 
FamOwn% × NC_D) at the 0.1% level. 
The coefficients in model 2 for the interaction term FamOwn%*(NC_D, NC_Ind% and 
NC_Factor) on multiple outside directorship proxy Busy(log) are negative and statistically 
significant (-0.5733, -0.3992, and -0.2505) at p < 0.05. Moreover, model 3 presents the 
coefficients for the interaction term FamOwn%*(NC_D, NC_Ind% and NC_Factor) on 
multiple outside directorship proxy Busy02, and the results are consistent with models 1 and 2 
(-1.4884, -1.4852, and -1.0081). Overall, these results are consistent with H2 and support our 
argument that an NC has a negative effect on the relationship between family ownership 
concentration and the outside directorships of board members. The presence of an NC thus 
suppresses the positive association between family ownership and board busyness. These 
results show that establishing board committees such as NCs, as recommended by GCC 
regulators, improves the board efficiency of firms with concentrated family ownership.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
6. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
                                               
25 *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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We conduct several robustness checks of our results. First, to address the concern that 
our results are not specific to the measurement of multiple outside directorships, and motivated 
by previous studies (Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2006; 
Jiraporn, Kim and Davidson 2008), we include two alternative proxies for multiple outside 
directorship measures (Busy03 and Busy04). Panel A of Table 6 provides evidence consistent 
with the hypothesis that family ownership increases the number of multiple outside 
directorships. For example, the results for models 1 to 8 show a positive relationship between 
FamOwn% and several proxies for directorships (Busy_BSize, Busy(log), Busy02, 
Busy03_BSize, Busy03(log), NoDir3, Busy03, and Busy04) at p<0.01 or better.
26 We also test the 
association between (FamilTop10(log)), the second measure for family ownership, and all of the 
proxies for outside directorships (Busy_BSize, Busy(log), Busy02, Busy03_BSize, Busy03(log), 
NoDir3, Busy03, and Busy04) at p<0.01 or better. These results provide consistent evidence 
that family ownership reduces board monitoring by engaging busy directors on the board. 
These results support H1. 
 [Insert Table 6 Panel A about here] 
Second, we also add two additional measures of family ownership (see Table 6, Panel 
B). Following previous studies (e.g., Jaggi and Leung 2007; Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan 
2007; Jaggi, Leung and Gul 2009), we include a dummy variable (FamMem_D) equal to 1 if 
the firm has at least one family member on the board, and otherwise 0, and another (Fam_D) 
equal to 1 if the firm is controlled (or has shares held) by family shareholders, and 0 otherwise. 
In both models, the magnitudes and signs of the coefficients do not change compared to our 
baseline analysis in Table 4. For example, the coefficients of models 1 to 3 for the association 
                                               
26 Busy_BSize is calculated as the number of directors in a firm that features two or more outside directorships 
scaled by board size, Busy(log) is a natural logarithm of two or more outside directors and Busy02 is a raw variable 
of the number of directors in a firm that features two or more outside directorships. We also repeat this for a firm 
where the number of directors in a firm that features three or more outside directorships (Busy03_BSize, 
Busy03(log), and NoDir3); Busy03 is dummy equal to 1 if a firm has more than three directorships, and otherwise 
0 and Busy04 is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm has more than four directorships, and otherwise 0. 
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between Fam_D and the three measures of busyness (Busy_BSize, Busy(log), and Busy02) are 
significant at p < 0.01. In addition, in models 4 to 6, the associations between family 
(FamMem_D) and the multiple outside directorship proxies (Busy_BSize, Busy(log), and 
Busy02) are also positive and significant at p < 0.01 (model 4) and p <0 .05 (models 5 and 6).  
[Insert Table 6 Panel B about here] 
6.1 Additional analysis: 
Another possible way for families to maintain control is to employ less experienced 
directors. Following previous studies (e.g., Badolato, Donelson and Ege 2014; Custódio and 
Metzger 2014), we hand collect data on board experience from annual reports. Eight variables 
pertaining to board experience are categorized into two sets: a) monitoring experience, defined 
as chairman and CEO experience (measured as the number of directors who have been a 
chairman or a CEO prior to joining the current board); and b) financial experience, defined as 
directors who have held a finance role (CFO, Treasurer, controller, head of accounting 
department, financial analyst, and banking) prior to joining the current board. In addition, we 
also sum the board experiences in firm i in year t.  
Following our main analysis, presented in Table 4, we scale monitoring experience and 
financial experience on board size. We also calculate the natural log of this variable. The results 
are tabulated in Table 7. The results are consistent with our hypothesis that families in the GCC 
are reluctant to promote or introduce high profile directors to the board of their firms. 
Specifically, we find a negative and statistically significant association between board 
experience and family ownership. We also find that family ownership reduces the number of 
directors with monitoring experience on the board. This suggests that families in the GCC 
practice several methods for transferring the monitoring power to their hands; this is not only 
effected through the employment of more directors with outside directorships, but also by 
reducing the appointment of experienced directors in the board.  
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6.2 Endogeneity Test: Two-Stage Least Squares  
The results of the OLS estimations suggest a positive and significant association 
between the family ownership measures (FamOwn% and FamilTop10(log)) and the proxies of 
multiple outside directorships (Busy_BSize, Busy(log), Busy02). However, the sign, magnitude, 
and/or statistical significance of these estimates may be biased owing to endogeneity issues. 
For example, family ownership and the error term in the first regression (Table 4) may be 
correlated. To address this potential problem, we use instrumental variable (IV) estimations 
(two-stage least squares) to re-test the OLS panel regression findings reported in Table 4. 
However, this approach is appropriate only if the IVs are correlated with the endogenous 
repressor (here, the family ownership measurements) but uncorrelated with the error term in 
the second-stage regression. Following previous studies that use this IV approach (e.g., Larcker 
and Rusticus 2010) and related empirical studies (Hasan, Hossain and Habib 2015; Al‐Hadi, 
Hasan and Habib 2015), we specify two firm-specific characteristics: a) a CSR Disclosure 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm discloses corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) activities, and 0 otherwise; and b) FamOwn_CI, measured as family ownership based 
on country and industry, as IVs. Several studies find CSR disclosures to be correlated with 
family ownership (Dyer and Whetten 2006) because of reputational concerns and a desire to 
protect family assets. We thus expect a positive association between CSR and family 
ownership. No study to date has shown an association between CSR and director busyness. 
The use of FamOwn_CI can be also justified by the premise that the industry level of family 
ownership in each year has a profound effect on the firm ownership level. For example, in GCC 
firms, family ownership is highly concentrated in the Materials industry sector (Arouri, 
Hossain and Badrul Muttakin 2014).  
Table 8 shows a positive association between our IVs and family ownership. The 
coefficients of both CSR Disclosure and FamOwn_CI are positive at the 1% level of 
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significance in models 1 and 2. In the second stage, the association between family ownership 
and busyness in both measures is positive and significant. For models 1 and 2, we find 
coefficients of 0.6510 and 1.2606 at p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively. Hence, even after 
controlling for endogeneity (2SLS), our results remain unchanged.27  
7. CONCLUSION 
This study examines the association between family ownership and multiple outside 
directorships in the GCC. The GCC is an ideal environment for the study because the region’s 
public firms have high levels of concentrated family ownership, it is common for firms to have 
multiple directorships, and compliance with corporate governance codes is not mandatory in 
much of the GCC, although many firms recently began establishing NCs voluntarily. In this 
scenario, both wealth and control can be expected to transfer from minority to family 
shareholders. Specifically, we expect that concentrated family ownership will lead to an 
increase in the number of directors who hold multiple outside directorships, thus disseminating 
control among board constituents. Using data from six GCC countries, we find that the number 
of directors holding multiple outside directorships is significantly higher for firms with higher 
levels of family ownership. We also find that the formation of a separate NC suppresses the 
positive association between family ownership and the appointment of busy directors. Our 
results also reveal that NC characteristics (e.g., size, independent directors, and NC_Factor) 
are significantly associated with a reduction in the number of busy directors on corporate 
                                               
27 We also conduct several post-estimation tests to further support our theoretical link using 2SLS. Weak 
instrument test results suggest that excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors, as the 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic is greater (21.84) than the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value (19.93) in models 
1 and 2. The results of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions do not reject the null hypothesis (p > .10), 
suggesting that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term but are correctly excluded from the second-
stage regression, indicating the validity of the instruments used for 2SLS. In neither model can we reject the null 
hypothesis, with J-statistics of 0.84 (model 1) and 2.316 (model 2). Finally, the Hausman (1978) test results 
strongly (p < .01) reject the heterogeneity of family ownership, implying that the 2SLS estimates are preferable 




boards. These results are robust to the use of various proxies for busyness and family ownership 
measures, and hold after controlling for endogeneity concerns.  
This study contributes to the growing literature on corporate governance in the GCC 
region. Prior studies do not consider the influence of family ownership, and neither do they 
investigate the role of the NC as a corporate governance mechanism.28 We contribute to the 
family ownership literature by showing that families maintain their control over minority 
shareholders through the appointment of busy directors to their boards. Our findings strongly 
support the recommendation that NCs be formed to protect minority shareholders by reducing 
the number of outside directorships. Their formation may also promote the effectiveness of the 
monitoring, advising, and control duties of board members. This study uses Type II agency and 
institution-based theories to examine our main question concerning the association between 
family ownership and multiple outside directorships held by board members. 
Our empirical findings show that in firms with highly concentrated family ownership, 
family owners exert a significant influence over the appointment of busy directors. These 
findings may be useful to investors, assisting them in making informed decisions regarding 
investing in firms with concentrated family ownership.  
The study does, however, have some limitations, which suggest a number of avenues 
for future research. First, the study focuses on the effect of family ownership as a firm capital 
structure on director busyness. Many other types of ownership could also be considered, such 
as institutional, state, and foreign ownership. Second, we encourage future researchers to 
consider such issues as whether the extent of managerial ownership influences the appointment 
of busy directors, in turn affecting the board’s monitoring quality. Our results may also have 
                                               
28 Prior research on the effect of family ownership concentration on multiple directorships has primarily been 
carried out in Western, predominantly Anglo-American, contexts. However, firms elsewhere, particularly in the 
GCC, operate with distinctive cultures and in distinct legal and institutional environments, which may have 
important effects on corporate governance. Hence, the applicability of Western models should be tested in 




important implications for other emerging economies whose policymakers and regulators may 
also need to address the conflict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders.  
In summary, we find that families in GCC firms maintain control over minority 
shareholders by appointing busy or less experienced directors to their boards. In addition, we 
find that the existence and quality of specialized board committees such as NCs improve board 
effectiveness. A key implication of these findings is that to protect minority shareholders, 
regulators should formulate laws that impose a strict limit on the number of multiple 
directorships that the board members of publicly listed companies can hold. In addition, 
regulators should require firms to disclose in their corporate governance reports such 
information as firm type (e.g., family or non-family); the kind of relationship ties (i.e., family 
or non-family) among owners, managers, and directors; and affiliate and family relationships. 
The findings of this study also suggest that regulators need to ensure greater transparency and 
a high level of disclosure to address agency problems if all shareholders are to influence firms’ 
decision-making process. These changes in corporate governance codes are essential if the 
GCC is to enhance its competitiveness and truly become a regional financial and business hub.  
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Panel A: Busy02 Sample selection 
Total Observations   
Number of Non-financial firms available in S & P Capital IQ for the GCC 
countries               3286 
Less  
Joint listed firms observation       -72 
Firms with an unavailable annual report for corporate governance data 
-
1688 
Key control variables              -435 
Total Observations 1091 
 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by year and Country (frequency) 
YEAR    BAH KSA OMN QAT UAE Total 
2006 1.00 13.00 55.00 0.00 0.00 69.00 
2007 1.00 27.00 59.00 0.00 2.00 89.00 
2008 1.00 53.00 63.00 0.00 4.00 121.00 
2009 4.00 60.00 63.00 0.00 7.00 134.00 
2010 7.00 70.00 65.00 1.00 18.00 161.00 
2011 9.00 70.00 63.00 2.00 26.00 170.00 
2012 10.00 71.00 64.00 2.00 27.00 174.00 
2013 9.00 70.00 64.00 2.00 28.00 173.00 
Total 42.00 434.00 496.00 7.00 112.00 1091 
 
Panel C: 
INDUSTRY Freq. Percent 
Consumer Discretionary 170 15.58 
Consumer Staples 240 22 
Energy 51 4.67 
Healthcare 31 2.84 
Industrials 209 19.16 
Information Technology 8 0.73 
Materials 291 26.67 
Telecommunication Services 35 3.21 
Utilities 56 5.13 







Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable                                 N        Mean               S.D.          0.25th       Mdn        0.75th 
Busy_BSize 1091 0.316 0.264 0.111 0.286 0.455 
Busy(log) 1091 1.046 0.680 0.693 1.099 1.609 
Busy02 1091 0.599 0.490 0.000 1.000 1.000 
FamilTop10(log) 1091 1.228 1.298 0.000 1.000 2.000 
FamOwn% 1091 0.078 0.155 0.000 0.000 0.106 
Age(log) 1091 22.324 12.424 13.000 19.000 31.000 
BoardSize(log) 1091 7.740 1.740 7.000 7.000 9.000 
Size(log) 1091 1430.520 5262.116 41.400 149.500 547.600 
Sale_Growth% 1091 39.203 486.093 -13.500 0.180 25.400 
OpMargin 1091 0.088 0.101 0.028 0.081 0.145 
DirOwnership 1091 0.061 0.116 0.000 0.000 0.100 
AC_Factor 1091 0.081 0.976 -0.507 0.352 0.774 
Notes: Table 2 Panel A reports summary statistics for the key variables for a sample of 1091from the GCC 
countries over the period 2005–2013. The data cover the period from 2005 through 2013. 
 
 
Panel B: Univariate Analysis: 
Variable Multiple Outside Directorships means      
Fmaily_D=0 Fmaily_D =1 Difference  t-stat 
Busy_BSize 0.2955 0.355 -0.0599 -3.5682*** 
Busy(log) 0.9975 1.1402 -.14272 -3.2922*** 
Busy02 0.5677 0.7040 -.1362 -4.5249*** 
Age(log) 2.8441 3.1283 -0.2842 -7.6590*** 
BoardSize(log) 2.0249 2.0307 -0.0057 -0.4286 
Size(log) 5.2069 4.9299        0.2769  2.2659** 
Sale_Growth% 0.4046 0.2031  0.2014  0.2291 
OpMargin 0.0876 0.0904 -0.0028 -0.4548 
DirOwnership 0.0294 0.1352 -0.1058 -14.827*** 
AC_Factor 0.0835 0.0063  0.0771  1.262*** 
Notes: Busy_BSize, Busy(log)  and  Busy02 are proxies for the multiple outside directorships of board members; Fmaily_D is 
dummy variable take value of 1 if family own percentage of shares on firm capital structure; 0 otherwise Age (log)  is the firm 
age measure as the natural log of the number of years since the firm was established; BoardSize(log) is the log of the total 
number of directors on firm board; Size(log) is the firm size measure as the natural log of total assets; Sale_Growth is the sales 
growth measure as the Sales revenues in year t minus sales revenues in year t_1 divided by sales revenue in year t-1; OpMargin 
is operating margin is annual operating income standardized by total assets; DirOwnership is the number of  directors who 
own more than 5% of firm ownership scaled by board size. AC_Factor is an eigenvalue obtained from three audit committee 
characteristics including size of audit committee, independent of audit committee chairman and number of independent 
directors on audit committee members. Each regression is reported using robust t-statistics at the firm level, industry lever and 
country level. 









Panel C: Nomination Committee (NC) and Audit Committee (AC) Component Factor 
Analysis 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
NC_Ind% 3.2027 2.23068 0.6405 0.6405 
NC_Size 0.97202 0.43421 0.1944 0.8349 
NC_ChairInd 0.53781 0.34931 0.1076 0.9425 
NC_NoMeeting 0.18851 0.08955 0.0377 0.9802 
NC_NoQual 0.09896 . 0.0198 1.0000 
Rotation: Promax     
Factor Variance Proportion     
Factor1 3.2027 0.6405     
     
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
AC_ChairInd 2.0193 1.23341 0.6731 0.6731 
AC_Size 0.7859 0.5911 0.262 0.9351 
AC_DirInd% 0.1948 . 0.0649 1.0000 
Rotation: Promax     
Factor Variance Proportion     





Table 3: Pearson correlation matrix   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Busy_BSize 1            
Busy(log) 0.9315*** 1           
Busy02 0.7704*** 0.8518*** 1          
FamOwn% 0.0372 0.0122 0.0486 1         
FamilTop10(log) 0.1865*** 0.2298*** 0.1764*** -0.1231*** 1        
Age(log) 0.0125 0.0074 0.018 0.1282*** 0.0667** 1       
BoardSize(log) 0.1633*** 0.3932*** 0.2959*** -0.0683** 0.2409*** 0.112*** 1      
Size(log) 0.2551*** 0.3192*** 0.2276*** -0.098*** 0.102*** -0.0208 0.3806*** 1     
Sale_Growth 0.0135 0.0134 -0.0148 -0.0049 0.0006 0.0032 0.0161 0.0809*** 1    
OpMargin 0.0379 0.057* 0.0526* 0.0051 0.0907*** 0.1656*** 0.0624** 0.1843*** -0.0147 1   
DirOwnership 0.0333 -0.0008 0.0414 0.4877*** -0.1135*** 0.0422 -0.0314 -0.0421 -0.0053 0.0637** 1  
AC_Factor -0.0739** -0.2024*** -0.1692*** 0.0334 0.0317 -0.134*** -0.5394*** -0.3777*** -0.0202 -0.0319 -0.097*** 1 
Notes: Busy_BSize, Busy(log)  and  Busy02 are proxies for the multiple outside directorships of board members; FamOwn% is the percentage of the shares own by family on firm capital structure; 
FamilTop10(log) is natural log of the number of representative directors from big 10 family over the GCC listed firms (see appendix 2); Age(log)  is the firm age measure as the natural log of the 
number of years since the firm was established; BoardSize(log) is the log of the total number of directors on firm board; Size(log) is the firm size measure as the natural log of total assets; Sale_Growth 
is the sales growth measure as the Sales revenues in year t minus sales revenues in year t_1 divided by sales revenue in year  t-1; OpMargin is operating margin is annual operating income 
standardized by total assets; DirOwnership is the number of  directors who own more than 5% of firm ownership scaled by board size. AC_Factor is an eigenvalue obtained from three audit 
committee characteristics including size of AC, independent of AC chairman and number of independent directors on audit committee members. Each regression is reported using robust t-statistics 
at the firm level, industry lever and country level. 





Table 4: Association between family ownership and busyness   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Busy_BSize Busy(log)  Busy02  Busy_BSize Busy(log)  Busy02 
 Tobit OLS Logit  Tobit OLS Logit 
Intercept 0.2306*** -1.3663*** -7.7959***  0.2303*** -1.1422*** -7.0020*** 
 (45.97) (-4.88) (-6.65)  (45.97) (-3.99) (-5.95) 
FamOwn% 0.1126** 0.3170** 1.0024**     
 (2.15) (2.33) (1.96)     
FamilTop10(log)     0.0374*** 0.1010*** 0.3141** 
     (2.64) (3.01) (2.28) 
Age(log) 0.0111 -0.0351 -0.1446  0.0101 -0.0325 -0.1342 
 (0.80) (-1.04) (-1.05)  (0.73) (-0.99) (-1.00) 
BoardSize(log) 0.1761*** 1.2065*** 3.5012***  0.1468*** 1.1007*** 3.2077*** 
 (4.18) (11.87) (7.80)  (3.35) (10.61) (7.09) 
Size(log) 0.0301*** 0.0706*** 0.2084***  0.0274*** 0.0633*** 0.1908*** 
 (5.09) (5.21) (3.69)  (4.60) (4.50) (3.32) 
Sale_Growth -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 
 (-0.26) (-0.60) (-1.23)  (-0.23) (-0.51) (-1.17) 
OpMargin 0.0203 0.1844 0.8864  -0.0018 0.1409 0.6988 
 (0.27) (0.93) (1.17)  (-0.02) (0.71) (0.92) 
DirOwnership 0.0697 0.0230 -0.0383  0.1345** 0.2048 0.5962 
 (0.98) (0.12) (-0.05)  (2.10) (1.15) (0.87) 
AC_Factor 0.0267*** 0.0565** 0.1252  0.0262*** 0.0518** 0.1149 
 (2.74) (2.37) (1.32)  (2.69) (2.20) (1.21) 
Firm Robust Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
IND Dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 1091 1091 1084  1091 1091 1084 
pseudo /R-sq 1.146 0.305 0.145  1.1540 0.300 0.1548 
 0.231*** - -    0.230*** - - 
 (45.97) - -  (45.97) - - 
Notes: Dependent variables in Table 4 are Busy_BSize, Busy(log) and  Busy02 which refer to the proxies for the multiple outside directorships of board members; Two independent variable use to 
examine the family ownership- control over the GCC listed firms; First, FamOwn% is the percentage of the shares own by family on firm capital structure; Second, FamilTop10(log) is natural log 
of the number of representative directors from big 10 family over the GCC listed firms (see appendix 2); Age(log)  is the firm age measure as the natural log of the number of years since the firm 
was established; BoardSize(log) is the log of the total number of directors on firm board; Size(log) is the firm size measure as the natural log of total assets; Sale_Growth is the sales growth measure 
as the Sales revenues in year t minus sales revenues in year t_1 divided by sales revenue in year t-1; OpMargin is operating margin is annual operating income scaled by total assets; DirOwnership 
is the number of  directors who own more than 5% of firm ownership scaled by board size. AC_Factor is an eigenvalue obtained from three audit committee characteristics including size of AC, 
independent of AC chairman and number of independent directors on AC members. Each regression is reported using robust t-statistics at the firm level, industry lever and country level. 
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The notation *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance relation at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Table 5 Panel A: Association between busyness and interaction between (Ownership and Nom. Committee) 
  Model 1-3   Model 4-6   Model 7-9 
 Busy_BSize  Busy(log)  Busy02 
 Tobit  OLS  Logit 
Intercept 0.2296*** 0.2285*** 0.2306***  -1.4129*** -1.4164*** -1.4371***  -7.8547*** -7.8654*** -7.3783*** 
 (41.09) (41.37) (38.28)     (-5.17) (-5.23) (-4.76)     (-6.76) (-6.77) (-5.98)    
FamOwn% 0.1979*** 0.1781** 0.1176*    0.5924*** 0.5347*** 0.3201**   1.6516** 1.8040** 1.1932**  
 (2.62) (2.40) (1.91)     (2.98) (2.74) (2.02)     (2.30) (2.55) (2.06)    
NC_D 0.0720***                   0.2209***                   0.8435***                  
 (3.04)                   (3.85)                   (3.37)                  
FamOwn% * NC_D -0.1777*                   -0.5733**                   -1.4884                  
 (-1.83)                   (-2.26)                   (-1.52)                  
NC_Ind%  0.0933***                   0.2206***                   0.6421***                 
  (4.53)                   (4.71)                   (3.16)                 
FamOwn% * NomInd%  -0.1270                   -0.3992**                   -1.4852**                 
  (-1.61)                   (-2.15)                   (-1.97)                 
NC_Factor   0.0458***    0.1058***    0.3198*** 
   (3.45)       (3.49)       (2.58)    
FamOwn% * NC_Factor   -0.0713       -0.2505**     -1.0081**  
   (-1.51)       (-2.10)       (-2.23)    
Age(log) 0.0108 0.0092 0.0004     -0.0356 -0.0376 -0.0550     -0.1409 -0.1373 -0.2203    
 (0.80) (0.69) (0.02)     (-1.05) (-1.11) (-1.47)     (-1.00) (-0.98) (-1.41)    
BoardSize(log) 0.1622*** 0.1511*** 0.2083***  1.1621*** 1.1478*** 1.2630***  3.4124*** 3.4403*** 3.5622*** 
 (3.72) (3.48) (4.47)     (11.45) (11.35) (11.36)     (7.53) (7.58) (7.51)    
Size(log) 0.0296*** 0.0295*** 0.0241***  0.0690*** 0.0685*** 0.0547***  0.2048*** 0.2009*** 0.1552*** 
 (5.47) (5.51) (4.16)     (5.09) (5.09) (3.76)     (3.56) (3.53) (2.59)    
Sale_Growth -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000     -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000     -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (-0.16) (-0.12) (-0.72)     (-0.25) (-0.28) (-1.09)     (-1.01) (-1.06) (-1.06) 
OpMargin 0.0326 0.0435 0.1226     0.2284 0.2483 0.3692*    0.9788 1.1312 1.8201**  
 (0.41) (0.55) (1.46)     (1.15) (1.25) (1.74)     (1.26) (1.46) (2.24)    
DirOwnership 0.0586 0.0625 0.0464     -0.0171 -0.0144 0.0135     -0.1407 -0.1762 -0.3249    
 (0.73) (0.75) (0.50)     (-0.09) (-0.07) (0.06)     (-0.20) (-0.25) (-0.41)    
AC_Factor 0.0233** 0.0170* 0.0261**   0.0441* 0.0320 0.0559**   0.0892 0.0692 0.1403    
 (2.29) (1.66) (2.33)     (1.84) (1.32) (2.10)     (0.93) (0.71) (1.38)    
Firm Robust Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
IND Dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 1091 1091 959     1091 1091 959     1084 1084 957    
pseudo R-sq 1.179 1.216 1.179     0.314 0.316 0.275     0.162 0.161 0.148    
sigma 0.2296*** 0.2285*** 0.2306***  - - -  - - - 
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 (41.09) (41.37) (43.11)  - - -  - - - 
Notes: Dependent variables in Table 4 are Busy_BSize, Busy(log)  and  Busy02 which refer to the proxies for the multiple outside directorships of board members; NC_D is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the firm has a dedicated nomination committee and 0 otherwise; FamOwn% is the percentage of the shares own by family on firm capital structure; FamOwn% * NC_D is the 
interaction between percentage of family ownership multiplied by nomination committee dummy; NC_Ind% is the percentage of independent directors on nomination committee; FamOwn% * 
NomInd% is the interaction between percentage of family ownership multiplied by percentage of independent directors on NC; NC_Factor is an eigenvalue obtained from five NC characteristics 
which includes  size of NC, independent of NC chairman, number of independent directors on NC members, number of NC meetings per year and qualification of NC members; 
FamOwn%*NC_Factor is the interaction between percentage of family ownership multiplied by NC factor eigenvalue; Age(log)  is the firm age measure as the natural log of the number of years 
since the firm was established; BoardSize(log) is the log of the total number of directors on firm board; Size(log) is the firm size measure as the natural log of total assets; Sale_Growth is the sales 
growth measure as the Sales revenues in year t minus sales revenues in year t_1 divided by sales revenue in year t-1; OpMargin is operating margin is annual operating income standardized by 
total assets; DirOwnership is the number of  directors who own more than 5% of firm ownership scaled by board size. AC_Factor is an eigenvalue obtained from three audit committee 
characteristics including size of AC, independent of AC chairman and number of independent directors on audit committee members. Each regression is reported using robust t-statistics at the 
firm level, industry lever and country level. 





Table 6 Robust analysis  
Panel A: Association between alternative measures of family ownership and busyness  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Busy02_BSize Busy02(log) Busy02 Busy03_BSize Busy03(log) NoDir3 Busy03  Busy04 
 Tobit OLS OLS Tobit OLS OLS  Logit Logit 
Intercept -0.0580 -0.6396*** -1.7393*** -0.1740*** -0.7437*** -2.6310*** -10.9888*** -3.9717*** 
 (-0.96) (-3.37) (-3.31)    (-3.34) (-4.60) (-5.93)    (-8.18) (-2.64) 
FamOwn% 0.0576** 0.1711** 0.4994**  0.0800*** 0.1231* 0.6026*** 1.0922** 0.9895 
 (2.04) (1.99) (2.01)    (3.15) (1.68) (3.05)    (2.08) (1.62) 
Age(log) -0.0068 -0.0196 -0.0524    0.0025 0.0253 0.0243    0.1439 -0.2124 
 (-0.90) (-0.86) (-0.88)    (0.42) (1.30) (0.49)    (0.96) (-0.98) 
BoardSize(log) 0.0559** 0.4840*** 1.4062*** 0.0663*** 0.3797*** 1.3558*** 4.1385*** 1.1833* 
 (2.45) (6.99) (7.75)    (3.18) (6.44) (8.47)    (8.16) (1.96) 
Size(log) 0.0100*** 0.0222** 0.0700*** 0.0129*** 0.0289*** 0.0943*** 0.3216*** 0.2277*** 
 (3.11) (2.28) (2.92)    (4.56) (3.48) (4.41)    (4.79) (2.71) 
Sale_Growth 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000    0.0021 0.0061 
 (0.11) (0.55) (0.22)    (-1.17) (0.08) (-1.18)    (0.55) (1.00) 
OpMargin 0.0190 0.1280 0.2500    0.0315 0.0327 0.2342    0.7104 1.4587 
 (0.46) (1.02) (0.80)    (0.99) (0.31) (0.94)    (0.90) (1.38) 
DirOwnership 0.0079 0.0578 -0.0132    -0.0205 -0.0007 -0.2802    0.7286 0.64 
 (0.21) (0.50) (-0.04)    (-0.62) (-0.01) (-1.11)    (0.96) (0.76) 
AC_Factor 0.0134** 0.0549*** 0.0955**  0.0080* 0.0103 0.0614*   0.2900*** 0.1822 
 (2.54) (3.42) (2.40)    (1.69) (0.76) (1.66)    (2.88) (1.32) 
Firm Robust YES YES YES YES YES YES Yes Yes 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES Yes Yes 
IND Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES Yes Yes 
Country Dum. YES YES YES YES YES YES Yes Yes 
N 1091 1091 1091    1091 1091 1091    1083 1076 
R-sq (Pseudo R2) -0.0426 0.084 0.105  -0.088 .32362 0.1777 0.236 0.083 
sigma 0.1250*** - - 0.1107*** - - -  








Table 6 Panel A Cont. 
  Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
  Busy02_BSize Busy02(log) Busy02 Busy03_BSize Busy03(log) NoDir3 Busy03 Busy04 
 Tobit OLS OLS Tobit OLS OLS  Logit Logit 
Intercept -0.0874 -0.5488*** -2.1291*** -0.0293 -0.6005*** -1.5499*** -9.0514*** -1.6058 
 (-1.59) (-3.31) (-4.78)    (-0.46) (-3.05) (-2.90)    (-6.65) (-1.07)    
FamilTop10(log) 0.0357*** 0.0956*** 0.2667*** 0.0134* 0.0297 0.1202**  0.6272*** 0.8119*** 
 (5.20) (4.86) (5.20)    (1.74) (1.27) (2.05)    (3.97) (3.66) 
Age(log) 0.0005 0.0163 0.0097    -0.0064 -0.0170 -0.0497    0.0554 -0.3486 
 (0.09) (0.84) (0.20)    (-0.85) (-0.74) (-0.85)    (0.37) (-1.54)    
BoardSize(log) 0.0376* 0.3003*** 1.1414*** 0.0459* 0.4630*** 1.3159*** 3.6218*** 0.4901 
 (1.71) (4.94) (6.99)    (1.93) (6.41) (7.02)    (7.03) (0.81) 
Size(log) 0.0105*** 0.0226*** 0.0760*** 0.0089*** 0.0198** 0.0610**  0.2515*** 0.1627**  
 (3.68) (2.72) (3.50)    (2.76) (2.01) (2.52)    (3.93) (2.18) 
Sale_Growth -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    0.0019 0.0051 
 (-0.92) (0.14) (-0.94)    (0.13) (0.57) (0.25)    (0.51) (0.99) 
OpMargin 0.0126 -0.0122 0.0925    0.0101 0.1056 0.1717    0.6102 1.199 
 (0.39) (-0.12) (0.37)    (0.25) (0.84) (0.55)    (0.75) (1.14) 
DirOwnership 0.0254 0.0705 0.0656    0.0408 0.1554 0.2720    1.1997 1.191 
 (0.82) (0.79) (0.29)    (1.17) (1.47) (1.01)    (1.57) (1.39) 
AC_Factor 0.0071 0.0062 0.0541    0.0135** 0.0558*** 0.0960**  0.2577** 0.1516 
 (1.47) (0.46) (1.47)    (2.55) (3.47) (2.43)    (2.54) (1.07) 
Firm Robust YES YES YES YES YES YES Yes Yes 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES Yes Yes 
IND Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES Yes Yes 
Country Dum. YES YES YES YES YES YES Yes Yes 
N 1091 1091 1091    1091 1091 1091    1083 1076 
R-sq (Pseudo R2) -0.099 0.1088 0.1902 -0.0418 0.082 0.104    0.245 0.1 
sigma 0.1098*** - - 0.1251*** - - - - 
  (35.85) - - (46.71) - - - - 
Notes: Busy02_BSize is calculated as the number of directors in a firm that features two or more outside directorships scaled it by board size, Busy(log) natural logarithm of two or more outside 
directors and Busy02 raw variable of the number of directors in a firm that features two or more outside directorships. We also repeated this for a firm that if the number of directors in a firm that 
features three or more outside directorships (Busy03_BSize and Busy03(log) and NoDir3); Busy03 is dummy equal to 1 if a firm has more than 3 directorships, otherwise 0 and Busy04 is a dummy 
equal to 1 if a firm has more than 4 directorships, otherwise 0; FamOwn% is the percentage of the shares own by family on firm capital structure; FamilTop10(log) is natural log of the number of 
representative directors from big 10 family over the GCC listed firms (see appendix 2); Age(log)  is the firm age measure as the natural log of the number of years since the firm was established; 
BoardSize(log) is the log of the total number of directors on firm board; Size(log) is the firm size measure as the natural log of total assets; Sale_Growth is the sales growth measure as the Sales 
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revenues in year t minus sales revenues in year t_1 divided by sales revenue in year t-1; OpMargin is operating margin is annual operating income standardized by total assets; DirOwnership is 
the number of  directors who own more than 5% of firm ownership scaled by board size. AC_Factor is an eigenvalue obtained from three audit committee characteristics including size of AC, 
independent of audit committee chairman and number of independent directors on AC members. Each regression is reported using robust t-statistics at the firm level, industry lever and country 
level. 
The notation ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel B: Association between alternative measure of family ownership and busyness: 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Busy_BSize Busy(log) Busy02  Busy_BSize Busy(log) Busy02 
 Tobit OLS Logit  Tobit OLS Logit 
Intercept -0.1412 -1.2321*** -7.2676***  -0.1698 -1.3699*** 4.8967*** 
 (-1.22) (-4.36) (-6.17)  (-1.47) (-4.89) (2.89) 
Fam_D 0.0693*** 0.1748*** 0.7103***    
 (3.82) (4.03) (4.37)     
FamMem_D     0.0441*** 0.0847** 0.2788** 
     (2.81) (2.20) (1.97) 
Age(log) 0.0049 -0.0493 -0.2154  0.0083 -0.0234 -0.0486 
 (0.37) (-1.49) (-1.58)  (0.63) (-0.70) (-0.38) 
BoardSize(log) 0.1595*** 1.1657*** 3.3650***  0.1604*** 1.1828*** 3.4165*** 
 (3.62) (11.39) (7.48)  (3.58) (11.16) (7.79) 
Size(log) 0.0297*** 0.0697*** 0.2044***  0.0304*** 0.0724*** 0.2189*** 
 (5.59) (5.20) (3.65)  (5.55) (5.22) (4.06) 
Sale_Growth -0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0054  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (-0.38) (-0.57) (-1.23)  (-0.34) (-0.43) (-1.15) 
OpMargin 0.0299 0.2071 0.9989  0.0196 0.2958 1.0206 
 (0.37) (1.04) (1.30)  (0.25) (1.50) (1.42) 
DirOwnership 0.0316 -0.0537 -0.5090  0.0951 0.3128* 1.3247** 
 (0.41) (-0.28) (-0.72)  (1.32) (1.75) (2.08) 
AC_Factor 0.0251** 0.0528** 0.1011  0.0277*** 0.0601*** 0.1490* 
 (2.51) (2.25) (1.05)  (2.76) (2.58) (1.65) 
Firm Robust Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
IND Dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 1091 1091 1084  1091 1142 1173 
adj. R-sq 1.187 0.313 0.163  1.158 0.289 0.1591 




 (41.38)    (42.00)   
Notes: Busy_BSize, Busy(log)  and  Busy02 are proxies for the multiple outside directorships of board members; Fam_D is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the family own a percentage of 
shares  on firm capital structure and 0 otherwise; FamMem_D a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if at least two director on the board represents same family ownership and 0 otherwise; Age(log)  
is the firm age measure as the natural log of the number of years since the firm was established; BoardSize(log) is the log of the total number of directors on firm board; Size(log) is the firm size measure 
as the natural log of total assets; Sale_Growth is the sales growth measure as the Sales revenues in year t minus sales revenues in year t_1 divided by sales revenue in year t-1; OpMargin is operating 
margin is annual operating income standardized by total assets; DirOwnership is the number of  directors who own more than 5% of firm ownership scaled by board size. AC_Factor is an eigenvalue 
obtained from three AC characteristics including size of AC, independent of AC chairman and number of independent directors on audit committee members. Each regression is reported using robust 
t-statistics at the firm level, industry lever and country level. 























Table 7: Experience (e.g., Total board experience, Mentoring Experience and Financial Experience) and Family Ownership  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 Exp_BS Exp_LN Exp MonExp_BS MonExp_LN MonExp FinExpe_BS FinExp_LN FinExp 
 Tobit OLS OLS Tobit OLS OLS Tobit OLS OLS 
Intercept 0.2686 -0.6480*** -8.6851*** 0.3372* -0.3940 -4.1783*** -0.0565 -1.4570*** -2.4347*** 
 (1.32) (-3.08) (-9.53) (1.81) (-1.57) (-5.14) (-0.38) (-5.98) (-4.27) 
FamOwn% -0.4274*** -0.8188*** -2.8870*** -0.3885*** -1.0420*** -2.8373*** 0.0078 0.1111 -0.0009 
 (-9.55) (-9.02) (-6.80) (-9.54) (-8.98) (-7.61) (0.24) (1.05) (-0.00) 
Age(log) 0.0186 0.0855*** -0.0056 0.0066 -0.0526 0.0035 -0.0014 0.0104 0.0566 
 (1.52) (3.34) (-0.05) (0.60) (-1.58) (0.03) (-0.15) (0.35) (0.82) 
BoardSize(log) -0.0402 0.8923*** 5.0396*** -0.0409 0.7463*** 3.0338*** 0.0465* 0.7829*** 2.0906*** 
 (-1.08) (11.80) (13.40) (-1.21) (7.96) (9.26) (1.74) (8.42) (10.19) 
Size(log) 0.0168*** 0.0281*** 0.1708*** 0.0172*** 0.0546*** 0.1496*** 0.0007 0.0144 0.0255 
 (3.21) (2.65) (4.08) (3.60) (4.17) (3.96) (0.18) (1.14) (0.89) 
Sale_Growth -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
 (-0.30) (-0.28) (-0.40) (-0.45) (-0.36) (-0.68) (0.07) (-0.00) (0.11) 
OpMargin 0.1436** 0.1012 0.5061 0.0026 -0.0692 -0.4642 0.1637*** 0.4703*** 1.1021*** 
 (2.12) (0.74) (0.93) (0.04) (-0.40) (-0.84) (3.36) (2.99) (2.97) 
DirOwnership -0.0771 -0.2428* -0.9276** -0.2113*** -0.2701* -1.8951*** 0.0544 -0.0275 0.0852 
 (-1.29) (-1.91) (-2.02) (-3.90) (-1.65) (-4.23) (1.26) (-0.18) (0.25) 
AC_Factor 0.0130 0.0125 0.1189 0.0012 -0.0023 0.0739 0.0086 0.0127 0.0142 
 (1.49) (0.71) (1.63) (0.15) (-0.11) (1.09) (1.37) (0.62) (0.30) 
Firm Robust YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IND Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 897 879 897 897 833 897 897 818 879 
R_squre - 0.397 0.488  0.426 0.417  0.178 0.195 
sigma 0.1781*** - - 0.1626*** - - 0.1291*** - - 
  (40.34) - - (42.36) - - (42.36) - - 
 Exp_BS: Number of board experience that calculated as sum of Mentoring experience (Chairman and CEO) experiences and Financial Experiences (CFO, Treasurer, controller, head of 
accounting department, financial analyst, and banking experience) scaled by the board size, Exp_LN: Natural Log. of total board experiences variable; Exp: Continuous variable of total 
experiences; MonExp_BS: Monitoring experience which consists of: Chairman and CEO experiences (Number of directors with or was chairman or was a CEO prior to join current board); 
scaled by board size; MonExp_LN; Natural log. of monitoring board experiences; MonExp: Centurions board monitoring experiences; FinExpe_BS: Financial experience that 
calculated as sum of directors that used to be in one of financial position prior to join the current board. Financial positions are CFO, treasurer, controller, head of accounting department, financial 
analyst, and banking experience) scaled by board size; FinExpe_LN: Natural log. of the board financial experiences; FinExpe: Continuous variable of the board financial experience. 








Table 8: Sensitivity analysis endogeneity test: 
  
Model 1 
Busy_BSize t  
Model 2 
Busy(log)t 
 1st Stage  2nd Stage  1st Stage  2nd Stage 
Intercept -.1758***  -0.1331   -.1758***  -1.5396***  
(-2.87) (-1.20) 
 
(-4.47) (-5.59)       




    
(2.87) 
   
 Busy(log)t 
    
1.2606**      
(2.35) 
All variables in Main Specification Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Year & Industry & Country Dummies Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Firm Robust Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Observations  1090 1090  1090 1090 
Instrumental Variables Coff. t-stat 
 
Coff. t-stat 
CSR_Disclosed 0.0303 (3.32) 
 
0.0303 (3.32) 
FamOwn_CI 0.7489 (5.97) 
 
0.7489 (5.97) 
Post-estimations Test for Instrumental Variables:           











2- Underidentification test 
     










3- Weak identification test 
     










4- Overidentification test 
     










5- Endogeneity test 
     




 Chi-sq(1) P-value 0.0105     0.0609   
Notes: CSR_Disclosed is dummy variable take value of 1 if firm has disclosed about corporate social responsibility activities, 
0 otherwise; FamOwn_CI is mean family ownership in country i in each industry. 





















Appendix 1: The GCC Corporate Governance Codes and Nomination & Remuneration 
Committee provisions. Source: the GCC Corporate Governance Codes. 
Description KSA OMN UAE QTR BAH KUW 
Year of issuance of 
corporate governance 
codes 
2006 2002 2007 2009 2011 2013 
Status of compliance with 
corporate governance 
codes 





from 2016  






- - Nomination Nomination Nomination 
Corporate governance 
codes provide separate 
section for Nomination 
committee provisions   
Yes - - Yes Yes Yes 
Provision for an 
independent directors on 
the nomination committee  
- - - Majority Majority Majority 
Size of nomination 
committee 
- - - - ≥ 3 ≥ 3 
The provisions of the 
nominations committee 
has  identified the number 
of external directorships 
for each member 
≤ 5 - - - ≤ 3 - 
N.C should regularly 
review the necessary time 
commitment from each 
member of boards 
Yes - - Yes Yes - 
Each member of board of 
directors should inform 
the N.C about the number 
of outside directorships or 
before taking any board 
appointments in another 
form. 





should recommend by 
nomination committee for 
all candidates either by 
board or shareholders 
election 
Yes - - Yes Yes Yes 
The relation (experience)  
with the other board 
memberships  should 
evaluate by N.C 










Appendix 2: GCC Big 10 families stock market 2008. 
Oman UAE Bahrain Kuwait Qatar KSA 
Al-Shanfari El-Nahyan Al-Mashani El-Kharafi El-Thani Al-Rajhi 
Al-Rawas El-Maktoum El-Khalifa El-Sabah Al-Mana El-Issa 
Al-Sultan Al-Qassimi Al-Mazrouq Al-Bahar Al-Attiya El-Mady 
Al-Lawati Al-Nuaimi Al-Meer Al-Rashed Al-Saad El-Saud 
Al-Mashani Al-Mualla Al-Faivre Al-Behbahani Al-Ali Al-Abanumay 
El-Busaidi Al-Dhaheri Al-Harthy Al-Fulaij Al-Naimi Al-Faris 
Al-Harthy Al-Mazrouei Al-Khalili Al-Ghanim Al-Mannai Al-Hakami 
Al-Saleh Al-Qubaisi Al-Murshidi Al-Marafi Al-Mohannadi Al-Husseini 
Al-Zawawi Al-Suwaidi Al-Razak Al-Sultan Al-Ansari Al-Omran 
Al-Hassan Al-Otaiba Al-Yahyai Al-Nafisi Al-Sulaiti Al-Rashid 
Source: TNI (2008) 
 
 
 
 
